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ability to strike the Soviet Union with long range bombers staged from the U.K. and armed with nuclear weapons; it relied on this strategy as a deterrent against Soviet aggression. The U.S. maintained this strategy as long as it held a monopoly on nuclear weapons. 1 Once the Soviet Union acquired nuclear weapons the U.S. had to change its strategy for the defense of Europe.
From the initial use of the atom bomb against Japan until well into 1947, the limits of the weapon governed its use in U.S. strategy. Their limited numbers and the cost to produce them, as well as the range limits of the delivery vehicle, the B-29
bomber, meant the U.S. still needed to rely on a conventional force in its strategy. 2 Additionally, the U.S. realized that the atom bomb was unlike any other weapon it its arsenal and that the destructive nature of the atom bomb meant it could not be employed like other weapons; it was considered to be a weapon of last resort. This concern was illustrated by President Truman when he commented:
I don"t think we ought to use this thing unless we absolutely have to. It is a terrible thing to order the use of something that is so terribly destructive beyond anything we have ever had. You have got to understand that this isn"t a military weapon. It is used to wipe out women, children and unarmed people, and not for military use. So we have to treat this differently from rifles and cannon and ordinary things like that. 3 The emergence of the Soviet Union as a threat to Europe in 1948 caused the U.S. to drastically change its strategy. By this time the range limitations were removed with the introduction of the B-36 bomber, and advances in fissionable materials meant the U.S. could produce far more atom bombs, removing constraints of scarcity. The main focus for the employment of nuclear weapons starting in 1948, code-named Half
Moon, involved two main objectives: slowing down advancing troops, and striking economic targets to compel surrender. Although there was debate about the political effects of employing nuclear weapons, American policymakers relied on nuclear bombs as the best alternative to the threat of a much greater conventional Russian military. 4 The role of nuclear weapons was largely as a deterrent against Soviet aggression.
MAD and Cold War Stability
When the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, U.S.S.R., detonated an atomic bomb in August 1949, the U.S. lost its monopoly and the arms race began. Although it took a number of years for the U.S.S.R to build an arsenal of atomic weapons, their acquiring the atom bomb did not cause the U.S. to back away from its strategic policy;
instead, the U.S. increased the destructive capabilities of its nuclear weapons. 5 By the 1960s, this increase in both the number and destructive capabilities of nuclear bombs ultimately lead to a bipolar Cold War standoff, and to the policy of "Mutual Assured
Destruction" (MAD). Under MAD, the robust second strike capability of each side means that neither one can "prevail" in a nuclear exchange: both sides will suffer unacceptable damage. Historian Gerard J. DeGroot described "MAD" by saying, "If you want a stable nuclear world . . . it requires . . . an understanding that if either side initiates the use of nuclear weapons, the other side will respond with sufficient power to inflict unacceptable damage". 6 This "balance of terror" led to the world enjoying a period of stability with regard to nuclear weapons employment. Although each side maintained a sufficient arsenal of nuclear weapons to combat the other, the threat of retaliation prevented either side from using them. It was understood that each side, if attacked, maintained the ability to launch a counter strike. The ability to launch a counter attack was assured by hardening launch facilities and maintaining multiple launch sites, and, by 1961, included the ability to launch nuclear weapons from a submarine force. 7 The threat of a counter strike acted as a deterrent which prevented either side from launching a first strike with nuclear weapons. Each side understood that any nuclear first strike would result in a counter strike that would bring about the annihilation of both combatants". But, it also led to an arms race resulting in each side acquiring numerous weapons. At the height of the race the U.S. nuclear arsenal numbered over 32,000 weapons and the U.S.S.R. over 45,000, including strategic missiles, tactical bombs, artillery shells, land mines, torpedoes, and anti-ballistic missiles 8 .
Although other nations, including the United Kingdom, France, and China had nuclear weapons, the stalemate between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. dominated the nuclear environment. As the two super powers aligned against each other, they built alliances with other nations to assure their mutual defense and prevented either side from employing a first strike with a nuclear weapon. This balance stayed in place until the fall of the Berlin Wall. While it was a frightening and nerve-wracking balance, especially in terms of crises, it produced a rough parity that preserved the Cold War peace. 9 Even with this balance of power the world understood the destructive capabilities of nuclear weapons. The UN implemented a policy to control the spread of nuclear weapons, with the ultimate goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons, through the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, (NPT) which was brought into force in 1970. 10 When introduced, the NPT aimed to reduce the number of nuclear weapons maintained by nuclear states and to prevent other nations from acquiring them. As noted by the 2005
Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT), the NPT is a landmark international treaty designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, and to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy with the ultimate goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons. "The NPT represents the only binding commitment in a multilateral treaty to the goal of disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States."
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The fall of the Soviet Union in 1989 created emerging nations, shifting the balance of power and leading other states and non-state actors to decide that they also needed nuclear weapons. Indeed, the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the former Soviet Union changed the balance of power in the world as well as the stability held by the two super powers. This change resulted in other nations acting on their desire to acquire nuclear weapons, and it has presented new challenges for the U.S., including nuclear proliferation, and nuclear terrorism.
Since the end of the cold war, the strategic situation has changed in fundamental ways. The Nuclear Posture Review, April 2010 states; "With the advent of U.S.
conventional military preeminence and continued improvements "To that end, the United States is now prepared to strengthen its long-standing negative security assurance by declaring that the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations". While the vision of a nuclear-weapon-free world is powerful, both existing nuclear powers and proliferators are unlikely to forego nuclear weapons entirely in a world that is dangerous and uncertain. Moreover, the emerging world would not necessarily be more secure and stable without nuclear weapons. Even if nuclear weapons were given up by the United States and other nuclear-weapon states, there would continue to be concerns about the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, which would not disappear and could worsen. WMD terrorism would remain a concern that would be largely unaffected by U.S. and other nuclear-weapon-state decisions. 15 To date the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has failed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Although one could argue the NPT has slowed the proliferation of nuclear weapons since the time it was brought into existence until today, additional states have nonetheless become nuclear states. In 1970, there were only five nations with nuclear weapons: the U.S., the former U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, France, and China. 16 Since that time, four additional states have acquired nuclear weapons; India, Pakistan, South Africa (although the latter has now demilitarized their nuclear stockpile), and North Korea. 17 Additionally, Israel is believed to possess nuclear weapons but has not conducted any documented tests to reveal its status, nor has it admitted to owning nuclear weapons. 18 Another three states have actively sought to acquire nuclear weapons: Iraq, Libya, and Iran. 19 In addition to the nations that have acquired nuclear weapons, some terrorist organizations, Al Qaeda specifically, 20 have expressed a desire to acquire nuclear weapons. Al Qaeda"s former leader, Osama bin Laden, stated it was a "holy Duty" to acquire nuclear weapons. Currently the threat of a terrorist attack against the U.S. or an ally is more likely than a deliberate attack by a state. 21 With the current changes in the governments of Iraq and Libya it is unclear if they still desire or will pursue nuclear weapons technology. It is clear that Iran and other nonstate actors still desire a nuclear weapon. The desire by Al Qaeda is fueled by its mission of causing terror; it sees a nuclear weapon as the means to inflict mass casualties and mass terror. 22 There are several reasons why Iran wants to join the other nuclear armed states. Three of these, according to author Alexander Shalashniy, are: 1) a desire to become the preeminent power in its natural sphere of influence and inherent competition with Saudi Arabia and Israel; 2) a desire for immunity to international sanctions and any effort at regime change; 3) a counterweight to regime weakness and internal divisional infighting. 23 Another justification used by Iran and noted by Giora
Eiland is the fact that there is no Shiite Muslim state with nuclear weapons: "In the eyes of Iranians, everyone has nuclear weapons: Christians, Hindus (e.g., India), Buddhists (in other words, China), Jews (Israel) , and even Sunni Muslims (Pakistan). Why is it just the Shi"ites that are not allowed to have nuclear weapons?" The increase in the number of both state and non-state actors who are, or desire to become, nuclear states is shifting the terrain on which U.S. nuclear policy rests.
When the former Soviet Union collapsed, "loose Nukes" became a possible source of obtaining a nuclear weapon. "Loose Nukes" is the term originally used to describe the nuclear weapons that were poorly guarded in the former Soviet Union. The term also refers to the materials or know-how that may fall into the wrong hands as well as the possibility former Soviet nuclear scientists might sell their skills to the highest bidder. 28 The growing danger from nuclear weapons is not only caused by the proliferation of capabilities to regimes but also from the continuing issues surrounding "loose nukes" in the former Soviet Union. In the areas within the original U.S.S.R the possibility of profiting from the remnants of the Cold War is irresistible to would-be nuclear smugglers. Currently there are hundreds of tons of bomb-grade material that remain under less-than-secure conditions. 29 Even though major steps have been taken to secure former Soviet weapons and nuclear material, this material remains a target for the acquisition of a nuclear devices and increases the likelihood that either a nation states, (like Iran), or a non-state actors (like Al Qaeda) will become nuclear capable.
Future Stability
How will this increase in the number of nuclear capable states and actors affect stability throughout the world? There are two schools of thought prevalent in this regard. One side believes that the increase in the number of nuclear states increases the stability of the world, while the other side believes this increase in nuclear armed states increases the possibility of a weaker state employing a nuclear weapon in a first strike attempting to use it before it loses it. Which view turns out to be correct is yet to be determined. What is clear is that the future of nuclear weapons and their role in policy is changing.
Those who believe that more nuclear states are better, like Kenneth N. Waltz, point out that the reason nuclear weapons were not used during the Cold War was the threat of retaliation against whoever used nuclear weapons first. 30 They believe that the fear of new states acquiring nuclear weapons is unwarranted and that additional states should be welcomed as nuclear armed states because such weapons are actually a source of stability. Waltz argues that the likelihood of nuclear war decreases as deterrent and defensive capabilities increase. Nuclear weapons make it hard for a nation to miscalculate the stakes involved when going to war, and the gradual spread of nuclear weapons is therefore more to be welcomed than feared. 31 He provides three main reasons for this belief: 1) International politics is a self help system and parties determine their own fate; 2) nuclear weaponry makes miscalculation difficult; 3) new nuclear states will feel the same constraints that present nuclear states have experienced, and will not enter into war. 32 Waltz understands that actors tend to become cautious when the stakes are very high. And stakes get no higher than when nuclear weapons are concerned.
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Taking a contrary position are those, like Scott D. Sagan, who believe that more nuclear armed states contribute to instability and a greater potential for nuclear war.
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They believe that one state may use nuclear weapons against an opponent in an attempt to prevent the opponent from acquiring nuclear weapons. Currently, there is the possibility that a state may take aggressive conventional action against an opponent to prevent them from acquiring nuclear weapons.
If the aggressor state does not have a strong enough conventional force to take action, but dose have nuclear weapons, they might use a nuclear strike to prevent an opponent from becoming a nuclear-armed state. Another concern is the possibility that two lightly armed nuclear states who were considering war might initiate the war with a nuclear strike because they do not have a retaliatory strike capability and they fear the actions of their opponent. Under either of these scenarios, more is not better, but indeed far worse for the stability of the world (and in direct conflict with the NPT). According to Sagan and those who agree with him more nuclear armed states will lead to even more proliferation as new nuclear states attempt to establish retaliatory strike capabilities by growing their stockpiles and hardening their launch facilities.
Current Nuclear Threat
According to Robert S. Norris in Global Nuclear Stockpiles 1945 Stockpiles -2006 , Russia leads the world in the number of nuclear weapons possessed. It is followed by the United States, France, China, the United Kingdom, Israel, Pakistan, India and North Korea. 35 As the U.S. considers future policy for employing nuclear weapons it is important to look at the threat of attack by both nuclear armed states and non-state actors who seek a nuclear weapon. Although only a few states have published their nuclear employment policy, it is possible to estimate the likelihood of an attack by nuclear armed states and non-nuclear armed states and non-state actors who desire nuclear weapons. Although France and the United Kingdom are nuclear states, the possibility of confrontation with either is so remote that they are excluded from consideration here.
Although the fall of the Berlin Wall improved relations between the U.S. and Russia, the Russians are unwilling to change their policy toward the use of nuclear weapons. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S. and Russia started to cooperate on several issues, to include securing loose nuclear weapons. Russia assumed the seat at the United Nations formerly held by the Soviet Union, and is a voting member of the Security Council. 36 However; recent tensions led to Russia declaring, in 2000, that it would continue to rely on nuclear weapons. In the document, Russia specified that it would use nuclear weapons in response to both nuclear and conventional attacks. 37 This policy clearly states that Russia is not limiting nuclear retaliation to nuclear attacks, but may also use nuclear weapons if attacked by conventional forces. Although Russia continues to rely on their nuclear arsenal as a deterrent, there is no indication that a U.S. -Russia nuclear confrontation is likely.
However, several European allies feel vulnerable to Russian military coercion and are dependent of Russia for energy needs. Russia no longer believes it has a large enough conventional force to defend its territory or interests and is putting increased emphasis on its tactical nuclear weapons. Russia is believed to have roughly 3,800 operational tactical warheads with a large number in reserve that could threaten a regional conflict. almost religiously, to the idea of nuclear ambiguity, or opacity. It has refused to either confirm or deny that it has the bomb, and it has repeated the same vague mantra that Israel will not be the first country to use nuclear weapons in the Middle East". 46 By stating they would not be the first to use a nuclear weapon, they imply that if they do have a bomb, they would only use it in retaliation for a nuclear attack. strategic dialogue. This has opened engagements on several issues to include security and defense. 47 Pakistan"s nuclear weapons policy is unclear but some information has been revealed by prominent officials. They describe four basic tenets for the use of nuclear weapons. 48 These are: "deter all forms of external aggression; deter through a combination of conventional and strategic forces; deter counterforce strategies by securing strategic assets and threatening nuclear retaliation; and stabilize strategic deterrence in South Asia". 49 Pakistan is also concerned about an Indian attack with a superior conventional force. 50 Whether they would use nuclear weapons first, or in retaliation for a conventional attack is not specified, but it can be assumed they might use nuclear weapons in either capacity.
The U.S. recognizes India as a key strategic player in Asia, and as a fellow publically documented its policy. India"s position is that nuclear weapons will only be used in retaliation for a nuclear strike. This spread of WMD requires the U.S. to consider its potential response to attacks perpetrated by either states or non-state actors against the U.S. or an ally.
The current U.S. policy on the employment of nuclear weapons is not to use them against a non-nuclear state, nor to use them in a first strike. The purpose, according to the Administration, "is either to assure, dissuade, deter, or defeat". There is no need for the U.S. to unnecessarily limit its options and remove a deterrent that may prevent a chemical or biological attack. Although the U.S. currently maintains a sufficient conventional force to respond to any attack without nuclear weapons, it makes sense to maintain the ambiguity that only nuclear deterrence can deliver. The possibility of a nuclear response causes greater fear for the enemy leadership and populace than conventional forces do. As Clausewitz points out there are three areas one must consider when determining scale and effort to be employed: the opponent"s strength of will, character, and abilities. 59 Before a state or a non-stare actor decides on an attack, it will consider the size and scope of the response. A state or non-state actor is more likely to risk a response from a conventional force, even though it is capable of inflicting an equal or greater amount of pain, than it is from a nuclear force because they do not fear a conventional response as much as they do a nuclear response. Thus, maintaining an intentionally ambiguous policy will caution any adversary against deciding to employ WMD knowing the decision to employ could have consequences that may include the use of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons also remove any question about a direct threat to a State or actor"s leadership.
By embracing a nuclear retaliation policy the U.S. may prevent attacks as it did under both Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) and Retaliation in Kind by reducing an opponent"s will to conduct an attack. Under those policies, no WMD attacks were perpetrated against the U.S. or its allies. Those policies established a position where every actor knew that any attack would result in nuclear war and their complete destruction including destruction of the leadership. A leader is less likely to miscalculate if he/she understands that the risk extends to himself or herself personally.
The U.S. has the capacity to respond to any attack under the Global Strike Contingency Plan 8022. Contingency Plan 8022 was developed by STRATCOM in 2004 with the Air Force and Navy to give the president a prompt global strike option with nuclear, conventional and information warfare capabilities. This plan is different than previous plans in its intent and capabilities. Global Strike is offensive and preemptive in nature; it is based on the assumption that deterrence will fail. Global Strike is focused on defeating a threat before it launches an attack. Although Global Strike is primarily a non-nuclear mission based on advanced conventional capabilities, space, and information warfare capabilities, it is clear that nuclear weapons could be used with the Global Strike option if decided on by the President. 60 The U.S. should maintain the flexibility offered to the President under an ambiguous policy.
The best option for a response to any attack by WMD is for the U.S. to maintain a policy that includes the potential employment of nuclear weapons. As noted above, other nuclear states have retained the possibility of a nuclear response to WMD attacks. . There is no need to remove a nuclear deterrent against chemical and biological weapons attacks as this would limit the options available to the president.
